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SAVING MOM AND POP: ZONING AND 
LEGISLATING FOR SMALL AND LOCAL 
BUSINESS RETENTION 
Dina Botwinick,*Jennifer Effron,** and John Huang*** 
INTRODUCTION 
Small and local businesses often contribute unique character 
to their municipalities, but advocates are concerned that large, 
national, chain retailers, who offer lower prices and one-stop 
shopping threaten the existence of smaller, specialized stores.1 In 
response to these concerns, communities of varying size and 
demographics throughout the country are using zoning 
regulations and other legislative measures to assist small and 
local business.2 Small and local businesses have always helped 
define what is unique, diverse, and special about New York 
City.3 In order to help promote their retention, the City must 
also seek out innovative strategies that combine both regulations 
                                                          
* Admitted to practice law in the States of New York and New Jersey, 
2009; Juris Doctor, Brooklyn Law School, 2008; Master of Forensic 
Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 2002; Bachelor of Arts, 
University of Florida, 1998. 
** Juris Doctor, Brooklyn Law School, 2010; Master of Urban Planning, 
Hunter College 2010; Bachelor of Arts, Tulane University, 2003.  
*** Juris Doctor, Brooklyn Law School, 2008; Bachelor of Arts, 
Michigan University, 2003. 
1 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, The New Rules Project, Retail, 
http://www.newrules.org/retail (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).  
2 See discussion infra Parts II and III. 
3 Press Release, Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev., Saving Independent Retail: 
Policy Measures to Keep Neighborhoods Thriving (Aug. 2009), available at 
http://prattcenter.net/sites/default/files/publications/PrattCenter_SavingIndepe
ndentRetail.pdf.  
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and incentives. This article reviews approaches employed by 
other municipalities and considers legal issues that might arise 
from them, with an eye toward small business retention in New 
York City. Part I discusses the state of small and local 
businesses in this economic crisis. Parts II and III provide an 
overview of several zoning regulations and other legislative 
measures enacted to aid small and local businesses in other 
municipalities and indicates where such initiatives have sparked 
lawsuits. Part IV considers potential legal challenges to these 
laws, concluding in Part V with a brief discussion of how New 
York City might consider moving forward.  
I. SMALL AND LOCAL BUSINESSES IN TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT 
Since the global financial crisis began in the last quarter of 
2008, businesses of all sizes—from family-owned “mom and 
pop” stores to national chain retailers—have suffered serious 
economic hardships and many have been forced to close. 
However, the current recession has hit small businesses 
particularly hard, with 2009 arguably being the worst year since 
the Great Depression.4 In November 2009, private sector 
employment decreased by 169,000 and small businesses (those 
with fewer than 50 employees) alone accounted for 68,000 of 
those jobs.5 This, however, was the smallest decline since July 
of 2008 and economic activity is beginning to stabilize6—an 
indicator that employment will as well. Small businesses make 
important contributions to economic growth,7 and often even 
                                                          
4 Ian Mount, And 7 Businesses That Did Not Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
31, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/business/smallbusiness/31 
deaths.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=“businesses%20that%20did%20not%20surviv
e”&st=cse.  
5 ADP, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT REPORT 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.adpemploymentreport.com/PDF/FINAL_Report_December_09.pd
f; see also Damien Cave, Family Businesses Are Reeling in Recession, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A12 (“Businesses with one to 19 employees, nearly 
all of them family run, lost 757,000 jobs from the second quarter of 2007 
through the third quarter of 2008.”). 
6 ADP, supra note 5. 
7 Cave, supra note 5. 
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more important contributions to the neighborhoods they serve.8 
As the country comes out of the recession it is important to look 
to future policies that aid small, locally owned businesses in 
order to assure that communities are more sustainable and 
resistant to national and international economic cycles. New 
York City relies on small businesses to provide job growth, tax 
revenues, and a sense of community.9 It is especially important, 
during economic downtimes, to help small businesses now and 
in the future.  
II. ZONING ORDINANCES 
State and local governments often use zoning to control the 
size, use, and appearance of improvements to real property. In 
1926 the Supreme Court upheld states’ rights to control 
development through zoning, holding that zoning ordinances are 
a valid exercise of state police power so long as they bear a 
rational relation to the health, safety, and general welfare of the 
community.10 State enabling laws generally allow local 
governments to assume most of this responsibility. The four 
commonly used zoning tools this Article examines are store size 
caps, community impact reviews, neighborhood serving zones, 
and formula business restrictions. Municipalities can combine 
several of these tools to offer greater protections for small and 
local businesses.  
A. Store Size Caps 
Store size caps limit the physical size of retail stores by 
amending zoning ordinances, either for an entire city or for 
designated areas within a city.11 Some municipalities put an 
outright ban on stores above a certain size, while others limit 
                                                          
8 Press Release, Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev, supra note 3. 
9 Nicholas Jahr, Maybe Beloved Shops Don’t Have to Disappear, CITY 
LIMITS, July 21, 2008. 
10 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–90 (1926). 
11 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Store Size Caps, http://newrules. 
org/retail/size.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
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their development to specific areas and, still others require 
developers to obtain a conditional use permit from a town 
authority.12 Since municipalities vary greatly in size, density, and 
existing zoning, actual allowable square footage will vary from 
place to place. Small towns and large cities across the United 
States are using store cap sizes to protect small and local 
businesses, decrease traffic congestion, lessen the burdens on 
infrastructure, regulate building design, and maintain pedestrian-
friendly districts, among many other planning goals.13 Fairfield, 
Connecticut, San Francisco, California and New Elba, New 
York offer examples of how store size caps are used. 
1. Fairfield, Connecticut 
Fairfield applies store size caps only in geographic areas 
designated in the zoning ordinance as “Neighborhood Designed 
Business Districts.”14 The purpose of these twelve districts is “to 
provide local neighborhoods with needed and desirable 
convenience goods and services in a manner which will not be 
detrimental to the surrounding residential areas.”15 
In July 2007 the Town Plan and Zoning Commission 
amended the local zoning regulations to require that stores, 
restaurants and banks in these designated areas not exceed 4,000 
square feet in interior floor area.16 These districts also prohibit 
drive-through restaurants and require a special permit for 
construction of a “formula business,” which is defined under the 
Fairfield Municipal Code, as a business  
that includes, utilizes or incorporates any two or more of 
the following standardized items that cause it to be 
substantially identical to more than five other stores, 
restaurants, businesses, offices or institutions regardless 
of ownership or location: A standardized array of 
                                                          
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 See FAIRFIELD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS § 12.5 (2009).  
15 Id. § 12.5. 
16 Id. §§ 12.5.1, 12.5.3, 12.5.15. 
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products or merchandise, a standardized menu, uniform 
apparel, standardized architectural design, layout or 
façade, standardized décor or color scheme and/or 
standardized signs trademarks, service marks or logos.17  
2. San Francisco, California 
In 1987, San Francisco created Neighborhood Commercial 
Districts to establish a zoning system that could be tailored to 
the unique characteristics of specific areas.18 The North Beach 
neighborhood is one of these special districts, which traditionally 
fostered small and locally owned businesses.19 Non-residential 
uses in North Beach, 2,000 square feet or more, are permitted 
only as a conditional use, subject to approval by the planning 
commission in order to maintain a scale of development 
appropriate to the district.20 A permit may only be issued after 
the developer proves that the use would serve the neighborhood 
needs and conform to the local architecture and style.21 
Adittionally, non-residential uses in the North Beach 
neighborhood exceeding 4,000 square feet are prohibited 
outright.22 These requirements are intended to ensure the 
                                                          
17 Id. § 31.2.41. 
18 S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 701.1(b) (2009).  
19 Id. § 722.1. San Francisco amended this Article in 2008; however, the 
relevant store size cap still applies to this discussion. Id. 
20 Id. § 722.21. Section 303(c) sets out standards for reviewing uses that 
exceed allowable square footage in Neighborhood Commercial Districts: 
(i) large-scale use will not foreclose other needed neighborhood-serving uses; 
(ii) use will serve the neighborhood and requires larger size to function; and 
(iii) building design respects district scale. Id. § 303(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). Section 
303(c)(2) requires that the use will not be detrimental to health, safety, 
convenience, and general welfare of nearby persons. Id. § 303(c)(2). 
Additionally, Section 303(j) requires the Commission to consider parking for 
large-scale retail uses as it affects street front usage, degree to which design 
encourages mixed-use, changes in traffic patterns, and increased demand on 
infrastructure. Id. § 303(j)(A).  
21 Id. § 121.2(a)(1)–(3). 
22 Id. § 121.2(b). The 4,000 foot restriction “shall not apply to a Movie 
Theatre use.” Id.  
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livability and attractiveness of North Beach by maintaining the 
existing scale of development, promoting a balanced mix of 
retail, services, and restaurants, and preserving the equilibrium 
of neighborhood-serving, city-wide specialty shopping and 
dining uses.23 There are also many other San Francisco 
neighborhood commercial districts where conditional permits are 
required for non-residential uses from 2,500 square feet to 6,000 
square feet.24  
Beyond Neighborhood Commercial Districts, as a city-wide 
measure, San Francisco amended the municipal code in 2004 to 
require a conditional use permit for any single retail use over 
50,000 gross square feet, except within downtown commercial 
districts,25 which allow up to 90,000 gross square feet before a 
conditional use permit is required.26 Further, single retail uses 
exceeding 120,000 gross square feet are prohibited outside of 
the downtown commercial districts.27 Such use is also prohibited 
within the downtown commercial districts if the retail business 
sells groceries, contains more than 20,000 stock-keeping units 
(the lowest level of merchandise identification) and devotes more 
than five percent (5%) of its total sales floor area to the sale of 
non-taxable merchandise.28 Outside of the downtown commercial 
districts these restrictions apply to new uses and the expansion 
of existing uses, but within the downtown commercial districts 
they apply only to new uses.29  
A 2006 case decided by the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of California supports San Francisco’s 
zoning approach. Wal-Mart Inc. v. City of Turlock upheld a 
town ordinance that required a conditional use permit for certain 
large retail stores and prohibited discount superstores (which 
were defined as large-scale retail stores over 100,000 square feet 
that also devoted more than five percent of sales floor area to 
                                                          
23 Id. § 722.1. 
24 Id. § 121.2(a). 
25 Id. § 121.6(a). 
26 Id. § 121.6(b). 
27 Id. § 121.6(c). 
28 Id. § 121.6(d). 
29 Id. § 121.6. 
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non-taxable items).30 The court found that the ordinance did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, because it was 
rationally related to the state and local interests of regulating 
traffic, air pollution, and urban blight.31 The court also found 
that any indirect effect on interstate commerce caused by the 
ordinance was far outweighed by the presumed benefits to the 
city and therefore did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution.32 
3. North Elba, New York 
In North Elba, New York, a lawsuit prompted the town to 
adopt a more stringent zoning ordinance. After being denied a 
conditional use permit, Wal-Mart unsuccessfully sued the town 
North Elba.33 The Appellate Division upheld the town’s denial in 
1998, finding that its concern with the store’s negative aesthetics 
was neither irrational nor arbitrary, and that it was not based on 
impermissible considerations such as public sentiment or 
community pressure.34 Subsequently, the town amended its code 
to officially limit a single retail trade use to 40,000 square feet 
of total floor area, even if spread out over more than one 
building.35 The code further capped shopping centers and other 
group retail business uses at 68,000 square feet.36 
                                                          
30 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1022 
(E.D. Cal. 2006). 
31 Id. at 1020. 
32 Id. 
33 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Planning. Bd. of N. Elba, 238 A.D.2d 93 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
34 Id. at 97. 
35 NORTH ELBA, N.Y., TOWN LAND USE CODE § 4.17.1 (2009). This 
amendment was clearly targeted at large-scale retailers as the average square 
footage of the three main types of Wal-Mart stores, “Discount Stores,” 
“Super Centers” and “Neighborhood Markets” were 107,000 square feet, 
187,000 square feet and 42,000 square feet, respectively, as of August, 2007. 
See Walmart Corporate, Our Retail Divisions http://walmartstores.com/ 
pressroom/news/5038.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).   
36 Id. § 4.17.2.  
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B. Community Impact Review 
Some communities do not prohibit large stores outright, but 
require a community impact review prior to granting a 
conditional use permit for large stores. The community impact 
review requires developers to demonstrate that a proposed 
development will not negatively affect the local community or 
environment.37 Large-scale retailers, whose presence may 
physically alter local character or may overburden the 
community’s infrastructure, often trigger the community impact 
review, causing delay and possibly deterring the development 
altogether.38 A number of communities in the United States 
employ this mechanism to provide a comprehensive review of 
the impact on the local economy and community in areas such as 
social services, tax revenues, downtown businesses, traffic 
congestion, and pollution.39 Pursuant to state enabling statutes 
and local ordinances, a review committee (often the local 
planning commission), may authorize a conditional use if it finds 
the proposed project meets certain criteria to properly address 
the local community’s needs and mitigate adverse impacts.40 
Brattleboro, Vermont and the State of Maine both use this 
zoning mechanism.  
1. Brattleboro, Vermont  
In October 2006, Brattleboro, Vermont adopted an 
amendment to its zoning ordinance to address large-scale retail 
use.41 The amendment requires that “no single Retail Store, 
                                                          
37 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Economic Impact Review, 
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/economic-impact-review (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Economic Impact Review]. 
38 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Community Impact Review: Vermont 
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/economic-impact-review (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2010). 
39 See id. for a list of communities employing this type of review. 
40 Economic Impact Review, supra note 37. 
41 BRATTLEBORO, VT., MUN. CODE, ART. II, § 2337 (2007), available at 
http://www.brattleboro.org/vertical/Sites/%7BF60A5D5E-AC5C-4F97-891A-
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Factory Retail Store or Supermarket shall have a Floor Area 
greater than 65,000 square feet,” without undergoing site plan 
and conditional use approval, as well as, satisfying additional 
criteria set out in the Vermont State Statute.42 This ordinance 
was drafted by the town’s planning commission, in response to 
town concerns over big-box stores43 and give the The 
Development Review Board (the “DRB”)44 the power to grant 
conditional use permits to help monitor the influx of large-scale 
retail businesses.45 In order to grant a conditional use permit, the 
DRB must hold a public hearing and make findings that the 
proposed use comports with general and specific standards set 
forth in the zoning ordinance.46  
A community impact review requirement is also included in 
the amendment.47 This mandates that the permit applicant work 
with a DRB approved consultant to analyze the project’s impact 
on employment, the costs of public and social services 
attributable to the development, the impact on property values 
(especially in the immediate area), the extent to which the 
project will affect other businesses in the area, and the amount 
                                                          
615C172A5783%7D/uploads/%7B2F2959C1-7B82-4448-9B1D-14A7B3F2 
A45E%7D.PDF. 
42 Id. § 2337(A). 
43 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Community Impact Review: 
Brattleboro, VT, http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/economic-impact-
review/community-impact-review-brattleboro-vt (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
44 The DRB is established in accordance with a referenced state statute 
that authorizes such a board to be created and members to be appointed by 
the municipality’s legislative body.  Id. § 1400.  
45 Id. § 1413. 
46 BRATTLEBORO, VT., ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 1413, 2337(A)(2)(a). 
General standards require the proposed use not adversely affect community 
facilities, traffic, area’s character, the by-laws in effect, and use of renewable 
energy resources. Id. § 1413(a). Specific standards may include requirements 
for lot size, parking spaces, landscaping, and fencing. Id. § 1413(b).  
47 Id. § 2337(A)(2)(b)(3). The other standards; (1) limit the location of 
large-scale projects; (2) require its construction to encourage public 
transportation, pedestrians, and cyclists; (3) require that the project comport 
with the nature and character of the town, and is consistent with the town’s 
growth plan; and (4) comply with enumerated aesthetic characteristics. Id. 
§ 2337(A)(2)(b).  
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of project-generated revenue that will filter back to the 
community and region.48 At the applicant’s expense, the DRB 
may also conduct an independent technical review of areas of 
the application that are of “particular concern.”49 
2. The State of Maine 
Through the lobbying efforts of over 180 small businesses, 
numerous municipal officials, and many labor, environmental, 
and community organizations,50 Maine enacted a similar law 
called the Informed Growth Act (the “Act”) in 2007.51 The Act 
requires municipalities that have received permit applications for 
large-scale retail developments (defined as any single-use space 
75,000 square feet or larger)52 to determine whether such 
development would have an “undue adverse impact” upon the 
local economy and community.53 “Undue adverse impact” is 
defined as development that negatively affects traffic, air and 
water quality, as well as economic impacts, such as those on 
other existing retail businesses, wages, municipal revenue, and 
employment.54 A qualified preparer, selected from a pre-
approved list and agreed upon by the applicant and the 
municipality is responsible for providing a “comprehensive 
economic impact study”55 that addresses these factors.56 After 
                                                          
48 Id. § 2337(A)(2)(b)(3). 
49 Id. § 2337(B). 
50 Institute for Local Self Reliance, Community Impact Review: Maine, 
http://www.newrules.org/print/retail/rules/economic-impact-review/ 
community-impact-review-maine (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
51 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4365 (2009). 
52 Id. § 4366(6). This also includes expansions that would cause a single 
space to be larger than 75,000 square feet unless the expansion is less than 
20,000 square feet. Id. 
53 Id. § 4367. 
54 Id. § 4366(10). 
55 Id. § 4367(1). The comprehensive economic impact study is prepared 
at the applicant’s expense.  
56 Id. § 4367(3). If the applicant and municipality cannot agree on the 
preparer within 15 days, the municipality may select the preparer. Id. 
§ 4367(2). The applicant must pay $40,000 to be deposited into a dedicated 
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affording the public an opportunity to discuss the proposal,57 the 
municipality’s decision-making authority may only approve a 
permit if it finds that there is likely to be no undue adverse 
impact.58 The Act applies to all municipalities in the state of 
Maine, except for those that have adopted their own impact 
studies for large-scale retail development, in accordance with the 
Act.59 
C. Neighborhood Serving Zones 
Neighborhood serving zones are another zoning tool aimed at 
helping to sustain small, local businesses by limiting the size and 
type of retail stores in certain districts. These regulations serve 
the everyday consumer needs of local residents and are not 
aimed at attracting tourists.60 Palm Beach, Florida uses this type 
of zoning. 
Palm Beach, Florida created the Worth Avenue Commercial 
District as a town-serving zone, where the size and type of 
stores is limited by zoning regulations.61 The purpose of the 
district “is to preserve and enhance an area of unique quality 
and character oriented to pedestrian comparison shopping and 
providing a wide range of retail and service establishments, to 
be developed whether as a unit or as individual parcels, serving 
the short term and long term needs of “townpersons.”62 New 
retail stores in the district are permitted a maximum of 2,000 
square feet of gross leasable area (“GLA”).63 The regulation 
                                                          
revenue account, from which the expenses involving the application are 
taken. Unexpended funds are returned to the applicant. Id. § 4367(3). 
57 Id. § 4368(1). 
58 Id. § 4369. 
59 Id. § 4371(1). 
60 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Neighborhood Serving Zones, 
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/neighborhoodserving-zones (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2010). 
61 PALM BEACH, FLA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 134-1156 (2010). 
62 Id. Townpersons are defined as full-time residents and visitors staying 
in accommodations and employees working in town. Id. § 134-2(b). 
63 Id. § 134-1157. 
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allows any existing use that exceeds this GLA to change to a 
similar type of commercial use without Palm Beach Town 
Council approval, but requires a store exceeding 2,000 square 
feet of GLA that wishes to change from one type of general 
commercial use to another to obtain permission from the city 
council.64 Furthermore, a business within this district may not 
occupy an additional location within 1,500 feet of the original 
business location.65 In order to obtain permission for 
construction of a single store in excess of 2,000 square feet of 
GLA, the regulation requires a showing that no less than 50% of 
their customers will be townpersons.66  
The Florida Court of Appeals upheld this regulation in 
1991.67 In Handelsman v. Town of Palm Beach, a landlord 
claimed that Palm Beach violated his right to Due Process and 
Equal Protection under the United States Constitution when it 
denied a special exception to convert a restaurant that existed as 
a prior non-conforming use into an apparel store.68 The Court 
found that the landlord retained his ability to use the property 
within permitted use and size requirements and that the 
ordinance was related to permissible public purposes.69 The 
Court also found that the requirements as to the needs of the 
townpersons reflected the town’s traffic and parking concerns 
and its interest in preserving establishments that serve local 
rather than regional needs.70  
                                                          
64 Id. § 134-1157(a)–(b). The code gives an example: If an already 
existing 8,000 square foot ladies apparel store desires to change to an antique 
store, it may do so without town council approval, but if the same store 
wants to switch to a bank or an office building, it would need a special 
exception from the town council. Id. 
65 Id. There is an exception to this limitation if the two locations together 
do not exceed 2,000 square feet of GLA. Id. 
66 Id. § 134-229(12).  
67 Handelsman v. Town of Palm Beach, 585 So. 2d. 1047 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
68 Id. at 1049. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. It should be noted that neither the neighborhood-serving aspect of 
the ordinance nor the space limitation was challenged here.  
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D. Formula Business Restrictions 
Other municipalities protect local businesses by prohibiting 
or deterring formula businesses, such as retail stores, 
restaurants, hotels, and other establishments that adopt 
standardized services, decor, uniforms, architecture, or other 
features virtually identical to businesses located elsewhere.71 The 
municipalities discussed below take different approaches to 
limiting formula businesses. While Arcata, California limits the 
number of formula businesses in certain neighborhoods,72 Bristol 
Rhode Island limits the size,73 and San Francisco, California 
requires conditional use permits in several districts and prohibits 
these establishments entirely in two districts.74  
1. Arcata, California 
In June 2002, Arcata, California (population 17,000), 
enacted an ordinance that limited the number of formula 
restaurants in the city to nine.75 The ordinance stipulates that any 
new formula restaurant that wishes to develop in the city 
subsequent to the enactment of the ordinance may only do so if 
it replaces an existing formula restaurant, which is further 
limited to specified business districts.76 Outside of these 
designated districts, formula retail is prohibited.77 
                                                          
71 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Formula Business Restrictions,  
http://www.newrules.org/retail/formula.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.3(e)–(f) (2009). 
75 ARCATA, LAND USE CODE § 9.42.164. Arcata is about 5 hours north 
of San Francisco, CA. The ordinance defines a “formula restaurant” as an 
establishment that offers standardized food, uniforms, décor, or similar 
standardized features that make that establishment substantially the same as 
more than eleven other restaurants, no matter the location or ownership. Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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2. Bristol, Rhode Island 
In May 2004, Bristol, Rhode Island adopted an ordinance 
restricting formula businesses larger than 2,500 square feet or 
those occupying more than 65 feet of street frontage, from 
locating in the town’s Historic District.78 The stated purpose of 
the Historic District Zone is to “regulate the location and 
operation of formula business establishments, within Bristol’s 
Historic District Zone, in order to maintain the district’s unique 
character and diverse blend of business offerings.”79  
Formula businesses are not strictly prohibited from Bristol’s 
Historic District, but must first obtain a certificate of 
appropriateness from the Historic District Commission, and a 
special use permit from the zoning board.80 The zoning board is 
required to ensure that certain standards are met before issuing a 
conditional use permit so that approval of a formula business 
will not alter the unique character of the historic district or 
contribute to a nationwide trend of standardized downtown 
offerings.81 The board must also find that the proposed business 
will contribute to a diverse and appropriate blend of businesses 
in the historic district zone and that it will complement existing 
businesses and aid in promoting the local economic base as a 
whole.82 Further, the formula business must be compatible with 
existing surrounding uses and it must be operated in a non-
obtrusive manner that preserves the community’s character and 
ambiance.83 To this effect, the ordinance prohibits drive-through 
                                                          
78 BRISTOL, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 28-150(h)(1)–(2) (2009).  
79 Id. § 28-281(b). Restaurants, retail stores, banks, and hotels are 
examples of businesses that are subject to the formula business 
standard, which the ordinance defines as one that maintains a “standardized 
(‘formula’) array of services and/or merchandise, trademark, logo, service 
mark, symbol, decor, architecture, layout, uniform, or similar standardized 
features, and which causes it to be substantially identical to more than five 
other businesses regardless of ownership or location.” Id. §§ 28-1. 
80 Id. § 28-281(d). 
81 Id. §2-150(h)(1). 
82 Id. § 2-150(h)(1)(a)–(c). 
83 Id. § 28-150(h)(1)(d). 
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windows, internally illuminated signs, and corporate logos.84  
3. San Francisco, California 
San Francisco’s 2004 zoning ordinance, discussed above, 
also placed restrictions on formula businesses in order to 
preserve neighborhood-serving retail operations and enhance 
future opportunities for resident employment in, and ownership 
of, such businesses.85 The city found that it could not effectively 
maintain a diverse retail base if formula retail went unmonitored 
in neighborhood commercial areas.86 
The city specifically found that formula retail would unduly 
eliminate small and medium-size businesses, which tend to be 
more unique, and would skew the business mix toward national 
rather than local, diverse retailers.87 Therefore, in specified 
Neighborhood Commercial Districts (“NCDs”), formula retail 
was prohibited outright, but generally permitted in all other 
neighborhoods after the neighborhoods received notice.88 
Moreover, the Planning Commission would only review formula 
retail use upon request.89 The 2004 Formula Retail Use 
ordinance also required formula businesses in other specified 
NCDs to apply for a conditional use permit to the Planning 
Department prior to commencing development.90 Conditional use 
authorization required that the Planning Commission conduct a 
public hearing and consider the number and similarity of other 
                                                          
84 Id. § 28-150(h)(1)(d)(3),(7),(8). This is a non-exhaustive list. 
85 S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.3(a)(2) (2009). The Planning code 
defines formula retail as a type of retail establishment with eleven or more 
other retail establishments in the United States. Id. § 703.3(b). Formula retail 
maintains two or more of the following features: standardized merchandise, 
building design and color, apparel, trademark, or signage. Id. 
86 Id. § 703.3(a)(9). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. § 703.3(e)–(f). 
89 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Formula Business Restrictions: San 
Francisco, http://www.newrules.org/retail/formula.html (last visited Mar. 10, 
2010). 
90 Id. § 312(d). 
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formula retailers in that NCD, compatibility of the physical 
appearance of the proposed establishment, the amount of 
existing vacant retail space, and the mix of neighborhood-
serving retailers with those that serve beyond the 
neighborhood.91 
Unsatisfied with the effectiveness of the 2004 ordinance, San 
Francisco voters approved the Small Business Act through a 
ballot proposition in 2006.92 The amendment requires all formula 
retail uses in any NCD to obtain a conditional use permit from 
the Planning Commission, subject to the guidelines set forth 
above.93 The Planning Commission determines if “the proposed 
use or feature, at the size and intensity contemplated, will 
provide a development that is necessary or desirable for, or 
compatible with, the neighborhood or the community.”94 
Further, this amendment allows the Board of Supervisors to 
adopt more restrictive provisions on permits for formula 
businesses or to prohibit them from operating in any other 
NCDs.95 
III. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS BEYOND ZONING ORDINANCES 
State and city governments can enact legislation beyond 
zoning regulations that will impact small and large businesses in 
different ways. As discussed below, some laws, such as local 
purchasing preferences, commercial rent controls, and tax 
breaks, are designed to help small businesses stay open, while 
others, like living wage ordinances, are designed to discourage 
non-unionized, large retailers (such as Wal-Mart) from opening 
stores. These tools have all been used in different areas 
                                                          
91 Id. § 703.3(h). 
92 Patrick McGeehan, Now, Big-Name Retail Chains Will Take the Other 
Boroughs, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
01/14/nyregion/14chains.html?_r=1&sq=midtown&st=nyt&scp=2700&pag
ewanted=print. This amendment became effective in 2007. 
93 S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.4(b). Formula retail uses are still 
fully prohibited in the North Beach NCD as well as the Hayes-Gough NCD. 
94 Id. § 303(c)(1).  
95 Id. § 703.4(c). 
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throughout the country at various times.  
A. Local Purchasing Preferences 
To generate more local economic activity, some states or 
cities give preference to local businesses for public contracts. 
Some will choose a local business when there is a tie bid with a 
non-local business, while other laws mandate that the 
government accept local business bids even when they are 
higher, so long as the local bid is within a given percentage of 
the lowest non-local bid.96 Local purchasing preferences are 
intended to boost the local economy by providing more jobs and 
greater tax revenue.97 Albuquerque, New Mexico and Wyoming 
have enacted local purchasing preference laws. 
1. Albuquerque, New Mexico 
Albuquerque, New Mexico enacted an ordinance to regulate 
the allocation of contracts and designated purchasing preferences 
for residential and local businesses in 1994.98 and recently 
amended it to enhance preferences for small local businesses as 
well.99 The ordinance regulates three types of business and the 
situations under which they are to be given preference.100 A 
“local business” is one whose principal office or place of 
business is in the Greater Albuquerque Metropolitan Area.101 
Local preferences apply to: requests for proposals, requests for 
bids, and requests for quotes for purchasing goods or services or 
for the award of concession contracts.102 “Resident businesses” 
                                                          
96 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Local Purchasing Preferences, 
http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/local-purchasing-preferences (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2010). 
97 See id. 
98 ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 5-5-17 (2009). 
99 Id. § 5-5-17(c).  
100 Id. § 5-5-17(A). 
101 Id. § 5-5-17(B)(1). The Greater Albuquerque Metropolitan Area is, 
“all locations within the city and Bernalillo County.” Id. § 5-5-3. 
102 Id. § 5-5-17(A)(1). 
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refer to those businesses that maintain their principal office and 
do business in New Mexico or New York.103 Pursuant to New 
Mexico State law, residential contractor preferences apply to 
construction contracts, and residential business and manufacturer 
preferences apply to requests for bids or requests for proposals 
for the purchase of goods or services.104 The Albuquerque 
ordinance accounts for the state law, but sets forth that the 
State’s residential business preference applies only when no 
offers have been made by local businesses.105 Finally, “small 
businesses” are local businesses that employ an average of less 
than twenty full-time employees and are afforded slightly more 
protection by the Albuquerque ordinance.106 A preference is 
given to small businesses in their requests for bids, proposals, 
and quotes for the purchase of goods or services.107 The stated 
goal of the new ordinance is to include small businesses in at 
least ten percent of total goods and services purchases; 
therefore, small businesses do not have a preference over local 
businesses, except as reflected in this ten percent goal.108 None 
of these preferences apply to solicitations for purchase or 
concession contracts for more than five million dollars, or if 
federal funds or projects are involved.109  
To determine whether a proposal or bid must be awarded to 
a preferred business, the local, residential, or small business is 
                                                          
103 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-21(A)(1)–(2) (West 2009). New York 
businesses are also given residential preference, because New York statutes 
had recently barred businesses residing in States which discriminated against 
New York state enterprises in their procurement of products and services 
from selling goods or providing services to New York state agencies. See 
N.Y. State Fin. Law § 165(6). This act eliminated the discriminatory 
treatment so that New Mexico businesses would be allowed back into the 
New York market. See  ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES. § 13-
1-21(A)(1)–(3). 
104 ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5-5-17(A)(3)–(4). 
105 Id. A “resident contractor” has similar characteristics to a “resident 
business.” Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-21 with § 13-4-2. 
106 ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 5-5-17(B)(5). 
107 Id. § 5-5-17(A)(2). 
108 Id. § 5-5-17(D).  
109 Id. § 5-5-17(A)(5). 
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given a five percent differential margin on its bid, quote, or 
proposal.110 For instance, if a local business bids $100,000 for a 
solicited project, and a competitor from outside the Albuquerque 
metropolitan area bids $96,000, the city would be required to 
accept the local offer, since the local bid is within five percent 
of the lowest non-local bid.  
In 2000, Bernalillo County, which is subject to 
Albuquerque’s zoning amendment, appealed a lower court’s 
ruling that mandated the county award a construction bid to a 
local business when the local bid was within five percent of the 
out-of-state bid.111 In Bradbury & Stamm Constr. v. Bd. of 
County Comm’rs, the county argued that the statute gave it 
discretionary power to determine whether the local preference 
was practicable, regardless of the percentage differential.112 The 
Court ruled that the local purchasing preference formula was 
mandatory and provided no discretion for the city when the local 
bid’s price differential is within five percent of the local offer.113 
According to the court, a local preference was per se practicable 
under the statute when the local bid was within five percent of 
the non-local bid and the county had no further discretion.114 
2. Wyoming 
In Wyoming, state or local authorities can only award local 
offers based upon preferential price differentials when 
purchasing agricultural products, or constructing and maintaining 
public structures, so long as they are not inferior to materials 
offered from out-of-state suppliers.115 A five percent price 
differential preference may be given for Wyoming materials 
when the contract is less than $5,000,000.116 Additionally, the 
                                                          
110 Id. § 5-5-17(B)(2). 
111 Bradbury & Stamm Constr. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo 
County, 35 P.3d 298, 299 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
112 Id. at 299. 
113 Id. at 302.  
114 Id. 
115 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-6-105(a) (2010). 
116 Id. §§ 16-6-105(a)-107. 
EFFRON FINAL.DOC 6/28/2010  2:48 PM 
626 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
statute prohibits a resident bidder from sub-contracting more 
than thirty percent to non-residents.117 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has upheld this local 
purchasing preference against Equal Protection and Due Process 
claims under both Wyoming and United States Constitutions. In 
Galesburg Constr. Co., Inc. of Wyoming v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Memorial Hosp. of Converse County, an out-of-state 
construction company was the lowest bidder, but lost a 
construction bid because its bid was less than five percent lower 
than that of the lowest residential bidder.118 After determining 
that the statute should not be examined under a strict scrutiny 
standard, the court examined whether the statute served a 
legitimate state interest and whether the statute was rationally 
related to advancement of that interest.119 In so doing, the court 
upheld the statute, finding that the local purchasing preference 
furthered the state’s legitimate intent to encourage local business 
through enhancing and stabilizing the local economy and tax 
base by keeping revenues within the state.120  
B. Commercial Rent Controls 
Commercial rent control, like residential rent control, is 
intended to cap the amount of rent that a landlord can demand, 
thereby eliminating landlords’ incentive to deny lease renewals 
for existing tenants.121 This functions to protect small businesses, 
which are often unable to compete with larger, national retailers 
who are able to pay much higher rents for choice locations. In 
the current economic downturn, small and large retailers alike 
are closing, but small businesses are being hit especially hard by 
                                                          
117 Id. § 16-6-103. 
118 Galesburg Constr. Co. of Wyo. v. Bd. of Trs. of Mem’l Hosp., 641 
P.2d 745, 747 (Wyo. 1982). 
119 Id. at 749–50. The Court found that neither fundamental rights nor 
suspect classification should be applied to corporations.  
120 Id. at 750. 
121 Free Advice, Landlord Tenant: What Is Rent Control, http://real-
estate-law.freeadvice.com/landlord_tenant/rent-control.htm (last visited Mar. 
25, 2010). 
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loss of sales,122 making it increasingly difficult to make already 
high rent payments.123 In New York City, small business 
advocates have seen this downturn as another opportunity to try 
to pass new commercial rent control regulation.124 (The last 
attempt was in 1984). A bill that would require landlords to 
negotiate lease renewals with commercial tenants or face binding 
arbitration, is awaiting Council vote as of the time of this 
writing.125 Although no other jurisdictions currently use 
commercial rent control, three cities in the United States have 
enacted commercial rent control ordinances in recent history: 
Berkeley, California (on three separate occasions beginning in 
1978); Albany, New York (for a brief period during 1948); and 
New York City (from 1945 through 1963).126 The current and 
previous attempts to revive commercial rent control in New 
York City, as well as the different regulations in Berkeley, 
California illustrate how rent control assists small business.  
1. New York, New York  
New York City’s commercial rent control statute of 1945 
expired in 1963 and stayed dormant until 1984 when City 
Council members introduced a bill that would apply rent 
controls to businesses occupying less than 10,000 square feet.127 
The bill would have limited rent increases to forty-five percent 
over five years for tenants in good standing.128 It called for 
                                                          
122 See supra Part I. 
123 Christine Haughney, Stores Go Dark Where Buyers Once Roamed, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009. 
124 Eliot Brown, Mom and Pop Go to City Hall, N. Y. OBSERVER, Nov. 
23, 2009. 
125 Small Business Survival Act, Proposed Int. No. 847-A (N.Y., N.Y. 
2008).  
126 W. Dennis Keating, The Elmwood Experiment: The Use of 
Commercial Rent Stabilization to Preserve a Diverse Neighborhood Shopping 
District, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 107, 124–38 (1985). 
127 Michel Marriott, A Bill to Control Business Rents Is Called Flawed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1988, at B6. 
128 Id. 
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arbitration when landlords and tenants could not agree on a lease 
renewal under that limit.129 Lawyers appearing before the 
committee cited aspects of the bill that might pose legal 
problems, including, (1) the city’s authority to enact such a law; 
(2) the legality of using private-citizen arbitrators to determine 
rents; and, (3) the limitation on a landlord’s fair return on his 
investment.130 The bill was defeated at the committee level,131 and 
commercial rent control was not considered again until recently. 
In 2008, City Council member Robert Jackson introduced a 
new rent control bill to address lease renewals for small, local 
businesses.132 The bill applies to independently owned and 
operated New York City businesses, with no more than 100 
employees, where such business is not dominant in its field.133 
Under this regulation, tenants would have the option to renew 
their leases for a ten-year term, unless they lost that right for 
specified reasons, such as consistently failing to pay rent, using 
the space in a manner substantially different from what is 
described in the current lease agreement or for conversion into a 
different commercial purpose by the landlord himself.134 If the 
landlord agrees to renew the lease, he and the tenant can 
negotiate the rent or either party can compel non-binding 
mediation.135 If after 90 days of negotiations and/or mediation 
                                                          
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Council Panel Defeats Commercial-Rent Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
1988, at B2. 
132 Small Business Act, Proposed Int. No. 847-A §§ 22-801, 22-802(c) 
(N.Y., N.Y. 2008). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. § 22-804(a), (d). Other grounds for non-renewal are: if the 
landlord is going to perform major construction that requires tenants to 
vacate; the tenant is using the space for illegal activities or permitting such 
activity; substantial breach of substantive lease obligation without cure within 
thirty days after written notice has been given to cure the breach; subletting 
without notification by certified mail to the landlord and without the 
landlord’s consent; or it has been determined that the tenant persistently 
violates New York City tax laws or fails to obtain necessary licenses relating 
to the premises or New York City’s laws. Id. § 22-804(d). 
135 Id. § 22-804(e)(1). 
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there is no agreement, the tenant must initiate arbitration in 
order to retain the right to renew.136 The arbitrator’s rent 
determination is binding and based on considerations including, 
the rental market in the area, the condition of the space and 
services provided, the landlord’s maintenance costs, and the 
extent to which the business is bound to a particular location.137 
However, if the tenant still does not agree to pay the determined 
rent, he may remain in that space, paying no more than five 
percent more than the previous year’s average rent, until such 
time when a new tenant approaches the landlord.138 Even then, 
the landlord must give the tenant the right of first refusal on a 
bona fide offer from a new prospective tenant.139 While this bill 
has significant support in the City Council, Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg opposes it.140  
2. Berkeley, California 
Berkeley, California regulated commercial rental practices 
three times, beginning in 1978.141 The first regulation, a ballot 
initiative passed in November 1978, “required a partial rebate to 
residential and commercial renters of the property tax reductions 
received by the city’s landlords as a result of Proposition 13.”142 
According to the regulation, eighty percent of a landlord’s tax 
savings were to be credited to renters in the form of rent 
reduction, and rent control initiatives were enacted to prevent 
landlords from offsetting the costs of the rebate through extreme 
rent increases.143 The initiative lacked effectiveness as it did not 
create a means by which to enforce the law and it expired by its 
                                                          
136 Id.  
137 Id. §§ 22-804(e)(3)(d), (e)(3)(f). 
138 Id. §§ 22-804(e)(3)(f), (e)(3)(g).  
139 Id. § 22-804(e)(3)(g).  
140 Daniel P. Bader, Is the Small Business Survival Bill Dead?, 
MANHATTAN TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at 10. 
141 Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F. Supp. 820, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
142 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
143 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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own terms on December 31, 1979.144 
In 1982, Berkeley passed another initiative, establishing the 
Elmwood Commercial Rent Stabilization and Eviction Protection 
Program.145 Under the ordinance, landlords needed “good cause” 
to evict commercial tenants or refuse to renew existing leases.146 
The stated purpose of the Elmwood ordinance was to protect 
commercial tenants who served local needs from rent increases 
that were not justified by their landlord’s cost increases and to 
test the viability of commercial rent control as a means of 
preserving such business outside of the downtown district.147 
Berkeley enacted its most recent commercial rent control 
ordinance for another commercial district in 1986.148 The stated 
purpose of the ordinance was “to preserve the unique character 
of the Telegraph Avenue Area Commercial District and to 
prevent business displacement by excessive rent increases and/or 
evictions.”149 The ordinance specified limited grounds for 
eviction,150 coupled with an arbitration procedure to determine 
                                                          
144 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
145 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
146 Id. (internal citations omitted). The eight reasons that constituted good 
cause to evict were:  
(1) failure to pay rent; (2) substantial violation of the terms of the 
lease (other than an obligation to surrender possession at the end of a 
term or upon notice); (3) committing a nuisance on the premises; 
(4) using the premises for an illegal purpose; (5) refusal to execute 
an extension or renewal of a lease upon expiration of a prior rental 
agreement; (6) refusal to allow a landlord access to make necessary 
repairs; (7) a landlord’s desire to recover possession to remove the 
premises from commercial use; and (8) a landlord’s desire to recover 
possession to make repairs that cannot be completed while the tenant 
occupies the premises. 
Id. at 824 n.3 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
147 Id. at 824 n.2 (internal citation omitted). 
148 Id. at 825–26. 
149 Id. at 826 (internal citation omitted). 
150 Id. at 826 & n.6. The enumerated grounds for eviction are:  
(1) failure to pay rent; (2) substantial lease violation; (3) committing 
a nuisance on the premises; (4) using the premises for an illegal 
purpose; (5) refusal to renew or extend an expired lease; and 
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commercial rents.151 This ordinance was successfully challenged 
for violating the Contracts Clause of the United States 
Constitution.152  
California has since banned commercial rent control by 
statute, stating that it discourages commercial development, 
discourages competition by giving an artificial advantage to 
certain enterprises at the expense of others and has adverse 
economic consequences statewide.153  
C. Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives can be used to protect small businesses in two 
ways: (1) by rescinding tax breaks currently allowed to large 
retailers; and (2) by providing tax incentives for small 
businesses. Over the last twenty years, state and city 
governments have attempted to use tax breaks and other kinds of 
subsidies to bolster their economies by attracting or retaining 
large retail chains.154 For example, as of 2004, Wal-Mart had 
received about $1 billion in public subsidies from state and local 
governments.155  However, there has been increasing awareness 
                                                          
(6) refusal to provide the landlord access to make repairs, 
improvements, or to show the premises to prospective buyers or 
tenants. 
Id. at 826 n.6. 
151 Id. at 826. Under the ordinance, “particular weight [was to] be given 
to the first criterion, which require[d] consideration of the extent to which a 
business contributes to the uniqueness and diversity of the Telegraph Avenue 
Area and to the availability of goods and services in the Telegraph Avenue 
Area and the city.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
152 Id. at 836. There was a claim under the Takings Clause of the United 
States Constitution as well, but since the amount of compensation had not yet 
been determined through arbitration, the claim was not ripe for judicial 
review. Id. at 841–42. 
153 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.25 (West 2010). 
154 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Eliminating Subsidies for Big 
Businesses, http://www.newrules.org/retail/rules/eliminating-subsidies-big-
business (last visited, Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Eliminating Subsidies]. 
155 PHILIP MATTERA & ANNA PURINTON, GOOD JOBS FIRST, SHOPPING 
FOR SUBSIDIES: HOW WAL-MART USES TAXPAYER MONEY TO FINANCE ITS 
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that such subsidies do not produce the desired economic 
effects.156 Although state and local governments are increasingly 
less inclined to assist large retailers through the use of tax 
subsidies, because large retailers already have a significant 
competitive advantage over small businesses, a comprehensive 
plan to protect small businesses will probably have to 
incorporate both approaches of tax incentives to be effective. 
According the Institute for Local Self Reliance (“ILSR”), 
granting subsidies to large businesses is particularly unwarranted 
in the retail sector, because this creates an uneven playing field 
for locally owned businesses,157 and big retail stores produce no 
net gain in employment or in wages paid.158 Some jurisdictions 
follow this line of thinking, as evidenced by the State of 
Arizona’s ban upon tax abatements for large retailers.159  
                                                          
NEVER-ENDING GROWTH 14 (2004), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst. 
org/pdf/wmtstudy.pdf. Good Jobs First is a self-described resource center for 
grassroots groups and public officials which aims to promote corporate and 
governmental accountability in economic development for working families.  
See Good Jobs First, Who We Are, http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/about_ 
us.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
156 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Years of Subsidizing Retail and 
Nothing to Show for It, http://www.newrules.org/retail/news/years-
subsidizing-retail-and-nothing-show-it (last visited, Mar. 10, 2010).  
157 Eliminating Subsidies, supra note 154. The Institute for Local Self 
Reliance (“ILSR”) asserts that subsidies are rarely provided to locally owned 
businesses, and that exacerbating the situation is the fact that the local 
businesses will often see their tax dollars being used to subsidize their biggest 
competitors. Id. 
158 Id. The ILSR references a study conducted in Minnesota which found 
that half of Minnesota’s recent subsidies were granted to companies paying 
wages more than 20 percent below market levels for their industries. Id. The 
ILSR also makes reference to a phenomenon that it terms “job piracy,” 
whereby cities use tax incentives and subsidies in attempts to lure companies 
from other cities or states. Id. According to the ILSR, “job piracy” produces 
no real economic benefit, as no new jobs are created, only the relocation of 
existing jobs. Id. 
159 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-6010(a) (2010). 
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1. State of Arizona 
In July 2007, Arizona adopted a law barring “municipalities 
in the Phoenix region from providing tax breaks or incentives to 
retail development.”160 The Arizona statute states that a city or 
town within the Phoenix metropolitan area with a population 
over two million “shall not offer or provide a tax incentive to a 
business entity as an inducement or in exchange for locating or 
relocating a retail facility in the city or town.”161 A city or town 
violating this prohibition “is subject to a penalty equal to the 
amount of the incentive realized by the taxpayer, extended over 
a period of sixty months.”162 In this manner, Arizona is 
attempting to eliminate the “subsidies” that certain municipalities 
offer as incentives for large retailers to locate or relocate within 
their jurisdiction.  
One of the exceptions to the Arizona ban is of particular 
interest. The statute does not apply to “[t]ax incentives for retail 
business facilities in an area designated as a redevelopment 
project, where the average household income is less than the 
average city household income, as determined by the United 
States census bureau.”163 This exception encourages 
development, big or small, in poorer neighborhoods. As further 
discussed below, big-box retail businesses in such areas may be 
a mixed blessing, as they offer low prices to customers, but may 
not pay employees a living wage. 
D. Living Wage Ordinances 
“Living Wage” ordinances usually require businesses that 
have contracts with local governments to provide a specified 
wage and benefits package that is higher than the federal 
minimum.164 Since the mid-1990s, more than 140 living wage 
                                                          
160 Id.  
161 Id. 
162 Id. § 42-6010(B). 
163 Id. § 42-6010(D)(3). Redevelopment projects are areas that relate to 
slum clearance and redevelopment. Id. § 36-1471(17). 
164 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Living Wage, http://www.newrules. 
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laws have been enacted.165 Municipal living wage ordinances 
vary in their provisions, but the overarching goal of these 
ordinances is to ensure that public contractors, employers, and 
corporations receiving public financial assistance pay their 
employees a specified wage and benefits package that is higher 
than the federally defined poverty level.166 More recently, 
Chicago, Illinois, and Lawrence Township, New Jersey, have 
both proposed living wage ordinances specifically targeted at 
formula retail businesses.167  
1. Chicago, Illinois 
In July 2006, Chicago, Illinois, became one of the first 
municipalities to attempt to specifically target large retailers with 
living wage legislation.168 The ordinance passed by the City 
Council was vetoed by Mayor Daley, and did not have enough 
                                                          
org/equity/node/2067 (last visited, Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Living Wage]. 
165 Jeanette Wicks-Lim, Should We Be Talking About Living Wages 
Now?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 11. 
166 See Living Wage, supra note 164. The “Federal Poverty Level” 
refers to the federal poverty guidelines issued each year by the Department of 
Health and Human Resources and are used for administrative purposes such 
as determining financial eligibility for certain federal programs. See Annual 
Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,199 (Jan. 23, 2009). 
As of February 2010, Congress had taken action to maintain the 2009 
poverty guidelines in effect until March 10, 2010. U.S. Department of Health 
& Human Services, 2009 Federal Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
poverty/09poverty.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). With respect to a four-
person family within the 48 Contiguous States and the District of Columbia, 
the poverty guideline is an annual income of $22,050. Annual Update of the 
HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4,200. Accordingly, a person 
working 40 hours a week would have to earn at least $10.60 per hour to earn 
above the federal poverty guideline with respect to a family of four. 
167 Big Box Living Wage & Benefits Ordinance, Proposed Municipal 
Code § 4-404-020 (Chi., Ill. 2006); Large Retail Living Wage & Benefits 
Ordinance, Proposed Ordinance § 1 (2006). 
168 Big Box Living Wage & Benefits Ordinance, Proposed Municipal 
Code § 4-404-020 (Chi., Ill. 2006). This ordinance was not limited to public 
contractors or those receiving public benefits as most living wage ordinances 
are. See id. 
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support to override the veto.169 
The proposed ordinance would have mandated that all large 
retail employers in Chicago “provide employees an hourly 
compensation package with a total value of no less than the sum 
of the living wage rate and the benefits rate for each hour that 
the employee works on the premises of a large retailer.”170 Large 
retailers are defined as those with annual gross revenues of $1 
billion or more and indoor square footage of 75,000 square feet 
or more.171 The ordinance defined the “living wage rate” as an 
hourly rate of $10.60, increasing by the annual “increase in the 
cost of living.”172 “Benefits rate” is defined as an hourly rate of 
$3.00, also increasing by the annual “increase in the cost of 
living.”173 Large retail employers who failed to pay a “living 
wage” would have been “required to pay the employee the 
balance of the compensation owed, including interest thereon, 
and an additional amount equal to twice the underpaid 
compensation.”174 Large retail employers who attempted to 
retaliate against employees would have been liable for “an 
amount set by the agency designated by the city to administer 
the ordinance or a court sufficient to compensate the employee 
and deter future violations, but not less than one hundred fifty 
dollars [$150.00] for each day that the violation continued or 
until legal judgment is final.”175  
2. Lawrence Township, New Jersey 
In 2006, the Lawrence176 Living Wage Coalition conducted a 
                                                          
169 See id. 
170 Id. § 4-404-020(a). 
171 Id. § 4-404-010(d). 
172 Id. § 4-404-020(b). 
173 Id. § 4-404-020(c). 
174 Id. § 4-404-070(f). 
175 Id. 
176 Lawrenceville and Lawrence Township are the same place. Lawrence 
Township still uses the name “Lawrenceville” occasionally. The title of the 
website is “Lawrenceville Living Wage Coalition” but all other references (in 
the website’s article itself, as well as the newspaper articles cited therein) to 
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successful petition to place a living wage ordinance aimed at 
large retailers on its ballot.177 The stated purposes of the 
proposed ordinance included (1) promoting wages and benefits 
that allow working families to meet basic needs; 
(2) safeguarding the economic well-being of the public; (3) 
reducing the burden on taxpayers; and (4) ensuring that large 
retailers pay their workers a living wage and encouraging them 
to provide important benefits.178 The proposed ordinance targeted 
“large retailers,” defined as retailers (1) having annual gross 
revenues totaling $1 billion or more and (2) having an “indoor 
premises” (which may be the aggregate of certain adjacent 
stores) comprising 100,000 square feet or more.179 Large retail 
employers would have been required to pay an hourly 
compensation package of no less than the sum of the “living 
wage rate” and “benefits rate” for each hour an employee 
worked on its premises.180 The “living wage rate” was defined in 
the proposed ordinance as “an hourly rate of $11.08—a wage 
which would enable a full-time worker to earn an income that 
will lift a family up to approximately 115% of the Federal 
Poverty Guidelines for a family of four” and would be subject to 
an annual cost of living increase.181 The “benefits rate” was 
established as $3.50, also subject to an annual cost of living 
increase.182  
Two weeks after the Lawrence Township Council postponed 
placing the the proposed ordinance on a ballot, a New Jersey 
State Superior Court judge ruled that the local officials did not 
have the power to change minimum wage standards in any 
                                                          
said Coalition are to the “New Jersey Living Wage Coalition.” See New 
Jersey Living Wage Coalition, Lawrenceville Living Wage Coalition, 
http://www.njlivingwagecoalition.org (last visited, Mar. 10, 2010).  
177 Id. 
178 Large Retail Living Wage & Benefits Ordinance, Proposed Ordinance 
§ 1 (2006). 
179 Id. § 2(c). 
180 Id. § 3(a). 
181 Id. § 3(b). 
182 Id. § 3(c). 
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way.183 An appeal was filed with the New Jersey State Superior 
Court, Appellate Division, but was eventually withdrawn.184 
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES 
Although state and local governments may enact zoning laws 
to protect small and local business, there are limits as to how 
intrusively the government may regulate. As demonstrated 
throughout this Article, small and local businesses may favor 
these measures to protect their interests and preserve their 
vitality, but such measures are potentially subject to legal 
challenges.185 Specifically, if proposed legislation permits 
preferences for local businesses over national businesses without 
a rational basis, attempts to manipulate market forces, interferes 
with private contracts between businesses, arbitrarily deprives an 
owner of a protected property interest, attempts to regulate local 
interests without authority from the state government, or exceeds 
the scope of its authority from the state government, the 
legislation may violate state and federal constitutional law.186 A 
detailed discussion of the potential legal challenges explores the 
viability of these tools in order to determine the best options for 
protecting local and small businesses in New York City.  
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine may prevent 
regulation involving community impact reviews, store size caps, 
and formula business restrictions. While the Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution gives Federal government the 
power to regulate commerce “with foreign Nations, and among 
                                                          
183 Lisa Rich, Superior Court Judge Denies Bid for Minimum Wage Hike 
on Ballot, TIMES (Trenton), Aug. 31, 2006, at A3. 
184 Lea Kahn, Living Wage Group Withdraws Appeal, LAWRENCE 
LEDGER, Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.njlivingwagecoalition.org/ 
press/articles/LawrenceLedger_2007-02-01.pdf. 
185 See discussion infra Part IV. 
186 Id. 
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the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,”187 the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, a product of judicial doctrine, applies to the 
states even when Congress has not acted to regulate 
commerce.188 Under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 
state and local governments cannot regulate matters that 
economically burden or discriminate against interstate 
commerce.189 Land use regulations such as store size-caps, 
conditional use permits, formula business restrictions and living 
wage ordinances, which all address national chain retailers, may 
be struck down under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Because 
such chain stores are frequently incorporated out-of-state and 
operate in “several states,” Commerce Clause violations are 
commonly argued by businesses seeking to operate in various 
localities.190  
Under modern Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a 
statute will almost always be struck down if it is facially 
discriminatory.191 A facially discriminatory statute is one whose 
language clearly makes a distinction favoring in-state commerce 
over out-of-state commerce, or local commerce over state 
commerce.192 Even if a statute is not facially discriminatory, it 
may still be struck down if it was enacted for a discriminatory 
                                                          
187 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. 
188 Oltra, Inc. v. Pataki, 273 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(internal citations omitted). 
189 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
190 Corporations are not protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the United States Constitution though, as it only applies to 
individuals. See Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 210–11 (1945) 
(affirming that a corporation is “neither a citizen of a state nor of the United 
States within the protection of the privileges and immunities clauses of 
Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution”). 
191 See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487–88 (2005). But see 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (finding overtly discriminatory laws 
may be upheld only if they serve a legitimate local purpose where 
nondiscriminatory alternatives are not available). 
192 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); 
Ore. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 107–08 
(1994). 
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purpose,193 or if its effects directly discriminate against out-of-
state competition for the benefit of in state economic interests.194 
Such “protectionism” in direct purpose or effect is subject to 
strict scrutiny by the courts, which requires that the government 
prove that the regulation is narrowly tailored and the least 
restrictive means of achieving a compelling purpose.195 Strict 
scrutiny is generally fatal to state or local regulation.196  
However, if a statute is facially neutral (one which does not 
explicitly discriminate against interstate trade)197 and the state or 
local government can demonstrate that the discrimination served 
a legitimate purpose unrelated to protecting local interests and 
that there are no less discriminatory means to achieve their 
permissible goals, the statute will usually pass judicial review 
                                                          
193 See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (finding 
an excise tax on all wholesale liquor sales imposed by Hawaii, and exempting 
local wines from the tax was purposeful discrimination because the alcoholic 
products which the law exempted competed with different beverages 
produced outside the state); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 
U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977). The test for standing articulated in Hunt has been 
superseded by statute, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
§ 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 2010), as recognized in 
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, 517 
U.S. 544, 557 (1996).  
194 See W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) 
(invalidating a subsidization program where, even though the funding tax was 
applied evenly to the in-state and out of state producers of milk, only the in-
state producers would be assured that their taxes paid would be refunded 
through the subsidy); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 
(1978); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
195 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1950); Baldwin, 294 
U.S. at 524.  
196 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 
520 U.S. 564, 568, 575, 583 n.16 (1997) (striking down a Maine statute 
providing tax exemptions to Maine charitable institutions generally, but 
providing only a more limited tax benefit on charitable institutions serving 
primarily out-of-state clients); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 
525, 526–29, 545 (1949) (holding that a state may not deny operating 
licenses to out-of-state distributors in order to stabilize the in-state milk 
supply).  
197 Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 446–47 (1978). 
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under the “Pike balancing test.”198 Under Pike, a facially neutral 
statute with a legitimate purpose, and merely incidental effects 
on interstate commerce, will only be invalidated if the burden on 
interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” in comparison to the 
local benefit.199 Because of careful drafting by state, city, and 
town legislators, the statutes, codes, and ordinances addressed in 
this article would likely face this lower level of scrutiny to 
analyze whether the facially neutral statute is Constitutional 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.200  
Regardless of meticulous drafting, however, certain zoning 
ordinances will still run the risk of being overturned because the 
burden on interstate commerce outweighs the benefit to the local 
interest.201 This is especially true if the purpose or effect of 
denying a development permit protects local business or 
excludes out-of-state business. Protecting local economies at the 
expense of outside competition is a discriminatory purpose.202 
For example, the community impact review required by 
Brattleboro, Vermont and the Maine State ordinance to protect 
local economies have such a discriminatory purpose.203 
Additionally, under San Francisco’s formula business restriction 
Article 7,204 Section 703.3(a)(2) specifically references the need 
to control the mix of businesses in the geographic area so that 
the district is not unduly skewed toward national retail.205 This, 
similarly, indicates a local preference. However, San 
Francisco’s Neighborhood Commercial Districts, discussed in 
Part II(A) of this Article, is a clear example of a zoning system 
designed to protect small business, cap retail store sizes, and 
                                                          
198 See Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) 
(articulating the balancing approach). 
199 Id. 
200 See id. 
201 See, e.g., Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 475 F. Supp. 2d 
1281, 1289–90, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d, 542 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2008). 
202 Id. at 1293 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 
U.S. 333, 351–52 (1977)). 
203 See supra Part II.B. 
204 See supra Part II.D. 
205 S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE § 703.3(a)(2) (2009). 
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withstand a Constitutional challenge under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.206 San Francisco’s Ordinance could serve as a 
useful model for a New York City paradigm.  
Careful crafting remains imperative. Discriminatory effects 
challenges could be brought against store size caps and formula 
business restrictions, as these types of restrictions may 
discriminate by denying national chains (who are typically 
incorporated out-of-state) their ability to buy and store in bulk 
and maintain their competitive edge.207 By removing the 
advantage out-of-state businesses have over local businesses, a 
statute discriminates in its effect. For example, in 1989 a 
Federal District Court in New York found that an ordinance 
prohibiting fishing boats over 90 feet long violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause because, while it only applied to one local 
vessel, there were at least ten out-of-state applicants who would 
have had to either buy smaller boats or be excluded from the 
market.208  
However, national chains incorporated out-of-state, like Wal-
Mart, Exxon or Staples will not always win a Dormant 
Commerce Clause claim against regulations with discriminatory 
effects. For instance, in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 
a Maryland statute made it prohibitive for Exxon to operate any 
retail service stations within the state but did not prevent Exxon 
                                                          
206 Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. 
Cal. 2006). “The Ordinance’s putative benefits—avoidance of traffic 
congestion, prevention of urban blight, minimization of air pollution, and 
preservation of land-use objectives as to location and character of economic 
zones within Turlock—are not so outweighed by any burden on interstate 
commerce as to render the Ordinance unreasonable or irrational.” Wal Mart 
failed to prove the imposition of “any disparate or other burden upon 
interstate commerce” Id. at 1017. 
207 See Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-
Capping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. 
LAW. 907, 941–42 (2005). Volume buying allows large national chains to 
obtain price concessions from suppliers and is a key for national chains to 
maintain lower prices than local businesses. Id. at 941. This requires large 
spaces to display and store the goods bought in bulk. Id. 
208 Atl. Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 893, 895, 897, 903 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
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from operating in the state.209 The statute was enacted in 
response to a petroleum shortage and complaints that petroleum 
producers and refiners received preferential treatment during 
shortages.210 The statute, therefore, uniformly required those 
producers and refiners to offer a voluntary price reduction to 
service stations supplied in Maryland. The purpose of the 
statute’s discrimination in support of the Maryland market did 
not distinguish between the out-of-state retailers, and its effect 
did not prevent out-of-state retailers from operating in the 
state.211 In so holding, the Supreme Court affirmed that the 
Commerce Clause provides protection for the general interstate 
market against undue regulatory burdens, not for only one 
particular business or enterprise.212 
Further, a recent case in New York illustrates how a court 
may give deference to legislatures when a plaintiff alleges 
discriminatory purpose and effect. In 1998, the Court in Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Town of East Hampton 
dismissed a supermarket chain’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
claim that the town’s store size cap was an undue burden on 
interstate commerce.213 The Court found that although the 
ordinance did seek to protect small businesses, it applied to both 
in-state and out-of-state businesses alike. The Court also noted 
that while some of the supermarket’s products came from out-of-
state, there was not even an incidental burden to interstate 
commerce.214 The Court considered whether the law applied 
evenhandedly to large and small businesses alike, rather than 
comparing the disparate impact the store size cap would have on 
out-of-state actors’ ability to bring their business into the town.215 
Finally, under the market participant theory though, state or 
                                                          
209 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 119, 121 
(1978). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 126. 
212 Id. at 127–28. 
213 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Town of E. Hampton, 997 F. Supp. 
340, 345, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
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local governments may favor local business over non-local 
business without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause by 
acting as a market participant. A government is a participant and 
not a regulator when, for example, it is contracting for its own 
construction project instead of regulating private construction 
contracts. Thus, local purchasing preference laws216 favoring 
government contractors are permitted through the market 
participation exception. Developed in 1976, the market 
participant theory illustrates the principle that while states should 
not be able to regulate private trade in the national market, there 
is no need to restrict a state from regulating itself.217 However, if 
the state or local government is acting as a market participant, it 
may not regulate commerce once it no longer has a proprietary 
interest. For example, while the state of Alaska was selling 
timber in the marketplace the state was permitted to regulate the 
terms of sale as a market participant; however an Alaskan law, 
which required all purchasers to process the timber in-state after 
the sale and prior to shipping, was not protected by the market-
participant exception. Once the timber was sold, the state no 
longer had a proprietary interest.218  
B. Equal Protection and Due Process 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees that, “no state shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”219 Equal Protection and Due Process claims against land 
use regulations typically allege injury to an economic interest, 
but the regulation will be upheld so long as it is rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose.220 Commercial use 
                                                          
216 See supra Part III.A. 
217 See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435 n.7 (1980) (citing 
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976)). 
218 S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984). 
219 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphases added). 
220 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926). 
However, Courts are less deferential when the classification involves a 
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zoning in New York City must be implemented in accordance 
with a “well considered plan.”221 A well considered zoning 
amendment is one that reflects the community’s changes and 
growth and would, “benefit the community as a whole as 
opposed to benefiting individuals or a group of individuals.”222 
It will probably be difficult for a plaintiff to prevail on an 
Equal Protection claim within this context. When permits are 
denied based on store size caps, community impact reviews, 
neighborhood serving tests, and formula business restrictions, 
challengers claiming a violation of Equal Protection may argue 
that the distinction was arbitrary and therefore an abuse of 
power.223 However, the governmental unit has only to show that 
there was a conceivable legitimate purpose for the legislation, 
such as concern for traffic congestion, environmental hazards or 
inadequate infrastructure.224 Also, municipalities can “enact land-
use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by 
preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a 
city.”225 Equal Protection claims could be made against living 
                                                          
“suspect class,” such as race or national origin or involves a fundamental 
right such as the right to privacy or free speech. See, e.g., Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72, 376 (1970); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). Classifications between different size retailers will not 
require this special protection. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 
485 (1970).  
221 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2009).  
222 Asian Ams. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265, 270 (N.Y. 1988). 
223 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 
987, 995–96 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (ruling in favor of defendant city where 
plaintiff Wal-Mart alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause because 
its stores were situated similarly to a range of other retail forms with respect 
to preserving traffic flows, air quality and preventing urban blight, yet the 
city ordinance allowed the other retail forms and barred Wal-Mart). 
224 See, e.g., id. at 1006 (holding specifically that the prevention of 
blight was a legitimate state interest); Nelson v. City of Selma, 881 F.2d 
836, 839 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the preservation of the character and 
integrity of single-family neighborhoods, prevention of undue concentration 
of population, prevention of traffic congestion, and maintenance of property 
values, were all legitimate purposes of planning and zoning).  
225 Trs. of Union Coll. v. Members of Schenectady City Council, 690 
N.E.2d 862, 864 (N.Y. 1997) (quoting Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
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wage ordinances since they generally apply to large employers, 
but governments can argue that larger businesses have a greater 
impact on the economy and may be better able to absorb the 
cost of paying higher wages.226 In 2002, New York City’s 
Mayor Bloomberg signed legislation requiring a living wage for 
all home health care and child care workers contracting with the 
city; however, as of this writing the effort to expand a living 
wage into the private marketplace remains a struggle between 
City Council members.227 
Plaintiffs are also unlikely to succeed in raising Due Process 
challenges that allege the government is denying a property use 
by restricting certain types of development or denying permits 
without a legitimate reason. In order to succeed on a Substantive 
Due Process claim, the property owner must first state a “valid 
property interest in a benefit that was entitled to constitutional 
protection at the time he was deprived of that benefit” and then 
show that the government acted in an arbitrary manner in 
depriving the property owner of that “protected property 
interest.”228 A property owner is entitled to a land use only if an 
agency does not have discretion to deny a permit.229 Further, the 
standard for determining a Due Process violation under the New 
York Constitution is the same as for determining a valid exercise 
of police power,230 and land use restrictions are constitutional if 
they are necessary to protect the public health, safety or general 
                                                          
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978)). In Union College, however, the 
Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited educational uses in a Historic 
District because historic preservation does not outweigh educational concerns, 
as a matter of law. Id. at 863–64. 
226 Memorandum from the Brennan Ctr. For Justice to Recipient (2006) 
(on file with author). 
227 Courtney Gross, Living Wage after Kingsbridge, GOTHAM GAZETTE, 
Jan. 2010, http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/work/20100115/22/3147. 
228 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Town of East Hampton, 997 F. Supp. 
340, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
229 See DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 132 
(2d Cir. 1998). Procedural due process requires that zoning decisions follow 
the proper rules of notification and hearings. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND 
USE LAW § 2.41 (5th ed. 2003). 
230 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 997 F. Supp at 350. 
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welfare of the citizens.231 Size caps, formula business 
restrictions, neighborhood serving zones, and community impact 
reviews must still be able to show that their sole purpose is not 
to prohibit big-box retail or favor local economic interests, but 
rather one that is a legitimate governmental aim.  
C. Takings 
The United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment promise 
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without 
just compensation”232 may be relevant in attempting to challenge 
zoning regulations. 233 If a land-use regulation places too great a 
restriction on the ability of a private property owner to develop 
or maintain any economically viable use of that land, then it 
may be considered a taking by the government and will be 
invalidated unless the property owner receives just 
compensation.234 While a regulation that deprives a landowner of 
all economically viable uses is always a taking,235 such 
circumstances are very rare.236 
For other regulations,237 courts will undertake a factual 
inquiry as set out by Penn Central Transportation Company v. 
New York City.238 A key consideration under the Penn Central 
test is whether there is an interference with “distinct investment-
backed expectations.”239 If a regulation goes too far in limiting 
                                                          
231 Asian Ams. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E. 2d 265, 270 (N.Y. 1988). 
232 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
233 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to states through 
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. See Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. 
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).  
234 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–42 (1987).  
235 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 
(1992). 
236 Id. at 1017–18. 
237 This applies only to those regulations that are not intended for 
nuisance prevention. A law that regulates a nuisance is never a taking. 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
238 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
239 Id. at 124. 
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the value of the land or severely diminishes the developer’s 
expected economic gains, it is considered a taking.240 While the 
Court did not define what it meant by too far, it did say that 
expectations had to be “reasonable.”241  
Most zoning tools242 are susceptible to takings claims, for 
which courts will look to the specific facts of each claim to 
determine whether a regulation constitutes a taking. While 
regulations that fall short of denying all beneficial use may still 
be considered takings,243 a New York case found that even 
substantial diminution in property value as a result of a 
regulation did not necessarily constitute a taking.244  
D. The Contracts Clause 
The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution 
states, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall . . . pass 
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”245 
The Contracts Clause is not a complete bar to legislative 
alterations of contractual obligations, as “its prohibition must be 
accommodated to the inherent police power of the State ‘to 
safeguard the vital interests of its people.’”246 In Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., the Supreme Court 
set forth a three-part inquiry to apply to the Contracts Clause.247 
Under the Energy Reserves test, a statute will be struck down 
                                                          
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 125. 
242 See supra Part II. 
243 Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 149–50. 
244 De St. Aubin v. Flacke, 496 N.E.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. 1986) (“[T]he 
property owner must show by ‘dollars and cents’ evidence that under no use 
permitted by the regulation under attack would the properties be capable of 
producing a reasonable return; the economic value, or all but a bare residue 
of the economic value, of the parcels must have been destroyed by the 
regulations at issue.”). 
245 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
246 Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 
400, 410 (1983) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 
398, 434 (1934)). 
247 Id. at 411–12. 
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for violating the Contracts Clause if it (1) has operated as a 
“substantial impairment of a contractual relationship”;248 (2) does 
not have, in justification, a “significant and legitimate public 
purpose”;249 and, based upon the legitimate public purpose 
identified, (3) is not justifiable as a reasonable adjustment of the 
rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties.250  
Judicial review of a Contracts Clause claim begins with a 
determination of “whether the state law has, in fact, operated as 
a substantial impairment to a contractual relationship.”251 The 
more severe the impairment upon the contracting parties, the 
higher the level of scrutiny.252 Energy Reserves elaborates on the 
“substantial impairment” requirement, noting that a statute 
resulting in total destruction of the contractual relationship, or 
even conversely, one restricting a party to gains reasonably 
expected from the contract (even though the obligations under 
the contract may be technically altered)253 would not necessarily 
constitute a “substantial impairment.”254.  
In Ross v. Berkeley255 the Court found that the commercial 
rent control ordinance “applie[d] exclusively and explicitly to 
                                                          
248 Id. (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 
244 (1978) (emphasis added)). The severity of the impairment imposed by 
government is directly proportionate to its burden to show that the nature and 
purpose of the legislation is for a valid state interest). Id. at 411. 
249 Id. at 411–12 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 
(1977) (emphasis added)). Legislation must not be designed and enacted for 
the mere advantage of particular individuals, but rather for the protection of a 
basic societal interest. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445. 
250 Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412. The balance between the 
public purpose of the legislation and adjustment of the rights and 
responsibilities of the contracting parties “must be upon reasonable conditions 
and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its adoption.” 
U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22. 
251 Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural 
Steel, 438 U.S. at 244). 
252 Id. at 411.  
253 Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 245. 
254 Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 411. Furthermore, the Court 
explained that the amount of previous regulation of the industry where the 
contract is implicated is another relevant consideration. Id. 
255 Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
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the contractual obligations of the narrow group of lessors and 
lessees in the Telegraph Avenue commercial district of the City 
[of San Francisco] and confer[red] a direct benefit on one class 
at the expense of the other.”256 This finding, along with the 
severity of the impairments, led the Court to exercise heightened 
scrutiny.257 In contrast, the Court upheld a Kansas court decision 
finding a statute valid under the Contracts Clause, because at the 
time the contracts were executed, “Kansas did not regulate 
natural gas prices specifically, but its supervision of the industry 
was extensive and intrusive.”258 As a result, the Court concluded 
that the reasonable expectations of plaintiff, Energy Reserves 
Group, were not impaired by the Kansas statute.259 This 
conclusion, in conjunction with the finding of a legitimate public 
purpose,260 led the Supreme Court to uphold the Kansas statute.261  
If a court finds a substantial impairment, it will then decide 
whether or not the impairment is justified by a “significant and 
legitimate public purpose.”262 A legitimate public purpose is one 
that does not focus on any specific enterprise or actor; rather, it 
is aimed at fixing a broad economic or societal problem, or 
enhancing the general welfare of the people.263 For example, In 
Allied Structural Steel Co., the Supreme Court found a 
Minnesota statute, which assessed charges against an employer 
who closed its offices and discharged employees without 
providing vested pension rights did not have a broad societal 
interest.264 The Court found it “applie[d] only to private 
employers who have at least 100 employees, at least one of 
whom works in Minnesota, and who ha[s] established voluntary 
private pension plans, qualified under § 401 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. And it applies only when such an employer 
                                                          
256 Id. at 833.  
257 Id. 
258 Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 413–14.  
259 See id. at 416. 
260 Id. at 417 n.25. 
261 Id. at 418. 
262 Id. at 411. 
263 Id. at 412. 
264 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
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closes his Minnesota office or terminates his pension plan.”265  
The final inquiry is whether the adjustment of “the rights 
and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon 
reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the 
public purpose justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.”266 This 
requires the court to determine whether the relationship between 
the impairment and the public purpose is sufficiently connected. 
For example, the town of Islip, New York, “could not use a 
zoning amendment to abrogate a prior subsisting lease in which 
the town itself was a party.267 This holding was influenced by the 
fact that the Town of Islip was a contracting party268 and should 
not be construed as barring zoning amendments from changing 
or voiding existing leases outright. Rather, any precedential 
value will only apply to those leases to which a local 
government, like the City of New York, is a contracting party.  
The Contracts Clause is most likely to apply within the 
context of commercial rent control legislation as this measure 
affects existing contractual relationships. Consequently, any 
commercial rent control legislation will have to set out its public 
purpose rather carefully in order to garner maximum judicial 
deference. Furthermore, the legislation will have to be 
connected to its public purpose in a way that minimizes 
“adjustments” to existing contractual relationships.  
E. Home Rule and Taxation 
Home rule is the legislative authority granted to local 
governments to manage their own affairs without interference 
from the state.269 Pursuant to the New York Municipal Home 
                                                          
265 Id. at 248.  
266 Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. 
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). 
267 Wa-Wa-Yanda, Inc. v. Dickerson, 18 A.D.2d 251, 258 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1963), aff’d, 238 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1968). 
268 Id. at 256. 
269 City of Ocala v. Nye, 608 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 1992); People ex rel. 
Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, No. 62419, 1986 Ill. LEXIS 303, *5–6 
(Ill. Nov. 20, 1986); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 
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Rule Law, local governments such as New York City may 
legislate local “property, affairs or government” matters.270 
States typically restrict the scope of local authority with 
respect to state affairs.271 New York’s highest court has 
determined that matters of state concern, such as taxation, affect 
residents of the entire state rather than only a particular 
municipality.272 However, the methods, agencies, and 
instruments to attain appropriate local government ends are 
ordinarily matters under the purview of local governments.273 
Municipal Home Rule authority grants local governments the 
power to regulate land-use, in general.274 Taxation matters are 
more complex: the use of any legislation regulating taxes to 
protect small businesses will trigger an examination of whether 
the Council of the City of New York would violate the scope of 
its authority by enacting such legislation.275 
CONCLUSION 
Zoning regulations are the most common tool used to protect 
                                                          
296–97 (N.Y. 1972). 
270 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i)–(ii) (McKinney 2010). A 
general law is a law enacted by the state legislature, which in terms and 
effect, applies alike to all counties (other than those wholly included within a 
city), cities, towns, or villages. Id. § 2(5). 
271 See Wambat Realty Corp. v. New York, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 
1977). A state affair is “a matter in which the people of the State as a whole 
[are] interested, as contrasted with a local affair in which the people of the 
cities [have] the first and final say.” Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 708 
(N.Y. 1929). 
272 See, e.g., City of New York v. New York, 730 N.E.2d 920, 926 
(N.Y. 2000) (finding taxation to be state concern); Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust 
for Cultural Res., 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1291 (N.Y. 1978) (finding maintenance 
of cultural institutions to be state concern); Adler, 167 N.E. at 710–11 
(finding health of citizens to be state concern). 
273 Browne v. City of New York, 149 N.E. 211, 220 (N.Y. 1925). 
274 Yoga Soc’y. of N.Y., Inc. v. Monroe, 56 A.D.2d 842, 843 (N.Y. 
App. Div 1977). 
275 See City of New York v. New York, 730 N.E.2d at 925 (citing N.Y. 
CONST. art XVI, § 1  (2010), which states that the power to tax rests solely 
with the State Legislature, who may grant such authority to the City). 
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small and local business, yet other tools have their own 
advantages. For instance, conditional exceptions that include 
community impact reviews are appealing as they allow 
individual communities to assess their particular needs and 
desires. In addition, courts tend to be more deferential to 
regulations that allow land use proposals to go through a 
substantive review process rather than being banned outright. 
However, some other types of legislation intended for this 
purpose may be less feasible than others. Commercial rent 
control is generally unpopular, as many state governments think 
it unduly interferes with free-market competition, discourages 
development and provides little incentive for landlords to 
maintain properties. Furthermore, tax incentives and living wage 
ordinances typically trigger greater political opposition and may 
require state as well as local action.276 
All of the tools discussed supra potentially implicate one or 
more Constitutional issues. Carefully drafting and tailoring 
legislation and zoning ordinances is necessary to help ensure that 
they do not violate the Constitutional rights of affected parties. 
Although courts are generally deferential to zoning ordinances, 
they must be enacted to protect the public health, safety or 
general welfare.277 The sole purpose of any proposed legislation 
or zoning ordinance cannot be to ban big-box retail or save 
small and local businesses.278 Studies that support proposed 
legislation, such as environmental impact statements, traffic 
congestion surveys, infrastructure tests, or predictions about 
potential vacancy rates will help an ordinance to withstand 
judicial scrutiny, as they provide evidence that it is designed to 
address issues of public health, safety, or general welfare.279 
When considering the feasibility of any particular tool, New 
York City should consider the potential legal implications, and 
draft carefully to avoid invalidation. Community education and 
                                                          
276 While New York City does have a living wage ordinance, it only 
applies to employees of certain service contractors that do business with the 
city itself. N.Y., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 6-109 (2009). 
277 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
278 See supra Part IV.A. 
279 See supra Part II. 
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involvement may be the best way to guide development in each 
district, as popular support is crucial to influencing government 
to make changes that would protect small and local business. 
 
